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INTRODUCTION

One hundred years ago Warren and Brandeis published their classic article, which advocated that the common law could and should
grant a remedy for violations of privacy.1 They identified two paradigmatic types of invasions of privacy: The exposure of the privacies of
life through the then swiftly growing mass media, and the use of individuals' names and pictures in promotional activities.
The article is frequently described in two partly inconsistent ways.
On the one hand, the article is supposed to be the most influential law
review article ever written, an essay that single-handedly created a tort
and an awareness of the need for legal remedies for invasions of p~ivacy. It is a classic, a pearl of common-law reasoning, and proof of the
ability of the law to meet new and challenging conceptions of value. On
the other hand, especially since the development of the constitutional
aspects of speech tort law, many question the validity and the desirability of the tort, particularly when it clashes directly with the freedom
to publish. In the last decade doubts have led some state courts to
explicitly reject any right of individuals to obtain a legal remedy for
publication of true private facts about them against their will. The Supreme Court has decided four such privacy cases, denying a remedy in
all of them. Commentators have suggested that the law in fact has not
responded favorably to Warren and Brandeis's particular concerns
-the protection of some areas of life and activity from truthful depiction and publication-and that this is a correct response. One commentator declared that it was time for a requiem. 2 Naturally, the three
trends, state court rejection of the tort, Supreme Court denial of a
remedy, and academic criticism, reinforce each other.
I shall argue that Warren and Brandeis's analysis of privacy and

1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
2. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291 (1983). For another recent criticism
emphasizing a historical study of the work, see James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 Haru. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation,
13 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 875 (1979). Zimmerman's analysis was anticipated by the impressive critique of Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 326 (1966). The detailed documentation of this development, fascinating as it is, goes beyond the scope of this paper. For some of the main
highlights of this development, see infra part III.
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its conflict with free speech is still more valid, clear, and adequate than
many of the decisions and literature that have come in its wake. The
article has stood the test of time better than many other contributions
to the question of privacy and its legal protection. Furthermore, I shall
argue that the strength of their analysis is on two levels. First, their
recommendation for the proper solution to the conflict between privacy
and free speech is wiser and more sensitive to the values of individuals
and societies than the almost absolute priority of speech advocated by
many courts and scholars. Moreover, their solution is still the one advocated by many scholars whose commitment to free speech cannot be
doubted. Second, they reached these better conclusions because their
approach to the conflict was clearer and sounder than other
approaches.
In Part II, I shall sketch Warren and Brandeis's analysis. In Part
III, I shall describe the ways in which the current law of privacy reflects either acceptance of or departure from their analysis. This
description will provide the background for my critical Part IV. I shall
suggest a general approach in Part IV to the privacy and free speech
conflict that is different and sounder than the one adopted by many
courts and commentators. I also will show how Warren and Brandeis
were closer to this approach than many of the decisions and much of
the literature that reflect the present state of the law. Warren and
Brandeis's analysis still provides us with a good starting point for this
important discussion because one hundred years later their analysis is
alive and well. By rearguing with Warren and Brandeis within their
framework, we might be led to modify some of their emphases, but
many more might agree that they had the better argument than their
critics.
II.

THE WARREN AND BRANDEIS ANALYSIS

The Warren and Brandeis article is an advocate's brief for a judgemade tort of invaaion of privacy. As in many such briefs, it identifies
when the advocates expect to meet resistance and what they may see
as evident and unproblematic. The article focuses on the resistance
and treats the latter summarily and sketchily.
Warren and Brandeis obviously took some of the premises essential to their argument to be self-evident: that press behavior and new
technologies of acquisition and dissemination of information present a
new threat to privacy, that privacy is very important to the lives of
individuals and to the well-being of society, that invasions of privacy
could occasionally cause harm and injury as great as those caused by
physical or financial loss, that in some cases invasions of privacy by
publication serve no legitimate public interest, and that the law should
be enlisted to deter this kind of behavior in the same way that it is
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used to prevent other types of harms.
Many commentators may find these premises questionable. For
some the magnitude or the seriousness of the loss of privacy is not
sufficiently established. Others believe that a legitimate public interest
always exists in what is published. A third group doubts whether the
law should limit publication of true information about individuals. If
the premises are true, however, they create a plausible skeleton of an
argument for making invasions of privacy, including unjustified invasions of privacy by publication, actionable in general.
Unfortunately, Warren and Brandeis did not provide us with an
elaborate defense of these premises. Rather than argue for them, they
merely stated them. They assumed that their audience agreed with
these premises and directed their rhetorical effort elsewhere. They devoted more than two-thirds of the article to the arguments that a basic
common-law principle is that the individual should have "full protection in person and in property," 3 that the harms to individuals generated by threats to privacy are inconsistent with this "full protection,"
and that a legal remedy for invasions of privacy, although superficially
similar to protection of reputation, is in fact the principle already recognized in the law concerning the right of people to prevent publication in other contexts. Warren and Brandeis simply argued to extend
the right into a more general right to an inviolate personality.
This part of the argument was required mainly because Warren
and Brandeis addressed their plea to the courts. They therefore had to
show a basis in existing common-law principles that would permit, and
maybe even require, judicial development of the law to protect privacy.4 To assess their argument today, however, it is more important to
focus both on what they said to show that the law should protect privacy and on the way in which they approached the conflict between
privacy and free speech. Because Warren and Brandeis concentrated
their energies on a different purpose, their arguments on these subjects
were rather sketchy. What they said, however, creates the skeleton of a
plausible argument that can and should be filled in.
I confess that some of my admiration for the piece rests on the
intuitions that I share with them. Like Warren and Brandeis, I find
their premises self-evident and compelling. Unlike them, I have had
the benefit of exposure to many others who do not share these intu3. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193.
4. For a critical survey of this part of their argument, see Walter F. Pratt, The
Warren and Brandeis Argument for a Right to Privacy, 1975 PUB. L. 161. The states
that have recognized a judicial right to privacy have not always embraced Warren and
Brandeis's reasoning. Occasionally, the states derived such a right directly from common-law protection of property. See Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis:
Privacy, Property and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. R.v. 647 (1991).
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itions. I was led to accept that it is not enough to state the premises.
One must elaborate on and argue for these premises in some detail. In
the last analysis, however, much still depends on intuition, and Warren
and Brandeis's skeleton of an argument is simple, elegant, and valid.
I doubt that many will seriously question Warren and Brandeis's
premise that changing technologies and developing human enterprises
create new threats to privacy. Mass media is among those human enterprises that threaten privacy. 5 Much more controversial is their premise concerning the harmfulness of violations of privacy. Some of the
criticism is directed at Warren and Brandeis's claim that invasions of
privacy were primarily motivated by gossip mongering.' I do not share
the view that journalism is motivated primarily by a desire to disseminate gossip, nor that the dissemination of or the reading of gossip is
necessarily undesirable. However, I do want to defend a different,
much weaker premise, which is all Warren and Brandeis needed and
which is of crucial importance: Some invasions of privacy by unwanted
publicity of truthful information may be harmful to both individuals
and society. I will explain the importance of this insight below. At this
stage I shall stress only that Warren and Brandeis themselves distinguished two types of harm that may be involved in circulating gossip.
The first was the emotional harm to the individuals who are denied the

5. People like James Barron and Don Pember, who claim that the press was not
overstepping in 1890, probably would concede this point. See DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY
AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

(1972); Barron,

supra note 2. The new scope and speed of national publication and the development of
an industry whose main task is the accumulation of information, including personal information, have clearly changed the ways in which publicity about individuals can be
given. The premise does not make assumptions about what is private and what is not.
Nor does it make assumptions about whether the threats that technological developments pose have materialized. Similarly, it does not say that the materialization of these
threats is necessarily undesirable. This therefore is an extremely weak, though necessary,
premise. If they had lived in the second half of this century, Warren and Brandeis probably would have added sophisticated electronic surveillance devices and computerized
data banks as new sources of threats against privacy that require new forms of legal
protection. The Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings in October 1991 dramatically illustrated the plausibility of this premise. Can anyone seriously doubt that the extensive
coverage was an important factor in the extent of loss of privacy for those involved?
Again, this premise does not consider, at this stage, whether the loss of privacy was
justified.
6. Warren and Brandeis asserted:
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become
a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. .. . To occupy
the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196. From reviewing the press of the time, the
critics doubt that gossip was offensive, that the disclosures were motivated by gossip, or
that the gossip was idle or vicious. See PEMBER, supra note 5, at 33-42.
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benefits of a necessary retreat from the world and of privacy and solitude. These individuals suffer "mental pain and distress far greater
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."'7 The second was the
harm to the social climate. Insensitivity to privacy "both belittles and
perverts" the aspirations of man and distorts proper priorities.8
Several famous privacy decisions illustrate that losses of privacy
can result in catastrophic consequences to the individuals involved.9
The social effects of not respecting privacy are harder to identify and
are less likely to arise in individual litigation. This does not mean,
however, that these effects do not occur or that they are not important
and profound. 10
Despite the sketchiness of their account, Warren and Brandeis
correctly identified the types of harms that invasions of privacy may
cause. Subsequent literature that elaborates on the interest in privacy
has expanded and documented the importance of privacy and the
harmfulness of its denial. Furthermore, Warren and Brandeis emphasized that the wish not to be the subject of discussion in public is not
an isolated, unintelligible wish; it is connected to human dignity, to
inviolate personality, and to the well-being of individuals and societies.
Thus, although the paradigmatic case discussed by Warren and Brandeis is freedom from unwanted publicity, it is seen as just one aspect of
a more general concern for human dignity.11

7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
8. Id.
9. One is Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940), in which a famous child prodigy grew to become a regular adult intent
on keeping his anonymity, tried in vain to prevent an accurate and detailed account of
his life by the press, and then committed suicide. Id. at 807. Another is Melvin v. Reid,
297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931). In Melvin the court granted a remedy to a former
prostitute, who was acquitted of murder and then rehabilitated herself and married into
a community not familiar with her past, against those who made a movie about the trial
and identified her real name, her current location, and her current identity. Id. at 93-94.
Yet another of a more recent vintage is Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762
(Ct. App. 1983). In Diaz the court declared that a prima facie cause of action existed for
invasion of privacy when a newspaper published the well-guarded fact that the first woman president of a college was, in fact, a man who had undergone a sex-change operation. The plaintiff suffered serious emotional difficulties because of the publication.
10. For example, press and privacy norms have changed considerably in this century. In the 1930s and 1940s many people did not know that FDR was paralyzed. Today,
this would be inconceivable. As recently as the 1950s the press did not discuss private
affairs of candidates for office, such as their sexual orientations or patterns of behavior.
Even the idea of conducting a televised investigation into the details of private conversations in the workplace, as was done in the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings, would
have been unthinkable not too long ago. Some may lament these developments, and
some may welcome them, but one cannot deny that they affect the kind of society in
which one lives.
11. Some critics agree that losses of privacy may have consequences, but they claim
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Because of their belief in the importance of privacy, Warren and
Brandeis reached another conclusion, which was a premise in their argument for legal protection and one with which I agree: Some invasions of privacy are undesirable even if one takes legitimate public
interests in publication into account. Warren and Brandeis did not
speak at great length or in great detail about the conflict between privacy and free speech. However, they were keenly aware of it. "Legitimate public interest" is the first defense that they considered and
granted. They described the purpose of the law in these terms:
The design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose
affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged
into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all persons,
whatsoever their position or station, from having matters which they
12
may properly prefer to keep private, made public against their will.
They conceded that the judgment of what is of legitimate public
interest is predicated not only on the nature of the information, but on
the identity and the role of the individual concerned. They further
conceded that it is desirable to repress only "the more flagrant
breaches." 13 Their tentative definition of unjustified invasions of privacy was:
matters ... which concern the private life, habits, acts, and relations

of an individual, and have no legitimate connection with his fitness for
a public office which he seeks or for which he is suggested, or for any
public or quasi public position which he seeks or for which he is suggested, and have no legitimate relation to or bearing upon any act
done by him in a public or quasi public capacity.1 '
For reasons explained in Part IV, this general resolution of the
conflict, under which many, but not all, privacy-invading statements
will be justified, is preferable to the position that Warren and Brandeis's critics advocate. Their critics believe that all truthful publications about individuals are protected under the First Amendment no
matter how intimate the information or how irrelevant to any justified
purpose of free speech. Warren and Brandeis's formula is vague and

that these harmful consequences often are trivial, that the complaints are petty, and that
the way of life that Warren and Brandeis wished to protect was patrician. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 2, at 914-18. It is extremely difficult to reason about such observations.
For many rape victims whose names are disclosed against their wishes or many homosexuals outed against their will, the consequences clearly are substantial. I do not find the
wish of parents not to have to face the picture of their disfigured child who they have
just lost in an accident to be a very patrician sentiment.
12. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214-15.
13. Id. at 216.
14. Id.
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open-ended. It allows for many and constantly changing conceptions of
what statements should be justified because of legitimate public interest. The critics' formula has the benefit of clarity and no inhibition of
speech. However, it trivializes the offensiveness and the humiliation involved in some violations of privacy by publication. This may lead both
to individual tragedies and to an undesirable social climate, just as
Warren and Brandeis noted. 15
A final point worth repeating is Warren and Brandeis's insistence
that the truth and the absence of malice should not be defenses in an
action for invasion of privacy."0 To them this was a defining feature of
the protected interest; it is not an interest that portrayals be accurate,
but rather an interest that some aspects of life should not be portrayed
at all. Warren and Brandeis did not offer the new remedy in order to
expand remedies for injuries to reputation in which truth was generally
accepted as a defense. They saw the interest in privacy as distinct,
unique, and irreducible to those in reputation or mental tranquility.
To summarize Part II: Although the premises that support Warren
and Brandeis's classic argument need more support and might need
some qualifications, in their essence they are valid and illuminating.
They provide a foundation for an argument for some cause of action
for blatant invasions of privacy by publication.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE WARREN AND BRANDEIS ANALYSIS
In principle, whether Warren and Brandeis's article was influential
and whether this influence was understandable in terms of legal craft
are distinct from the questions of the validity and strength of their
position on the conflict between privacy and free speech. They could
have been right, but not influential, or wrong and nonetheless influential, or neither. One of the complexities of this piece of legal history,
however, is that the substantive criticism of their position on the conflict always has been combined with a demystification of the magnitude
of their contribution. As a result, many of their most powerful critics'
have argued with different emphases for three theses: (1) Their rhetorical influence was immense; (2) this influence, when analyzed more
closely, was in fact very small; and (3) this influence was what it should
have been because their message was ultimately undesirable.
I take issue primarily with the third thesis. The second thesis of

15. See id. at 196.
16. Id. at 218.
17. See Kalven, supra note 2, at 327 (describing it as the most influential law review article ever written); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383
(1960); Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 293.
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the critics, however, also has limits. I think Warren and Brandeis
would have liked to have seen a bit more protection of privacy in the
bottom line of decisions, as well as a different approach to privacy.
Nonetheless, the critical assessments claiming that the law did not respond to their concerns distort the law of privacy in ways that unfortunately affect not only the image of Warren and Brandeis's contribution
but also the progress of the law of privacy.
History has not judged the article to be misguided and wrong. The
power of Warren and Brandeis's analysis is persistent and enduring.
Much of the greatness of the American tradition is reflected in the
grand contours of their approach. This includes the often elusive realizations that freedom is a complex social value and that privacy and
human dignity are freedom's essential components.
It is notoriously difficult to document and analyze the possible influences that the ideas of Warren and Brandeis have had on other
ideas, including Brandeis's own attitude towards the conflict between
privacy and speech, both of which he championed, and the developments of the law of privacy. It is impossible to do justice to the voluminous literature on the Warren and Brandeis article in the confines of
this paper. I shall, however, sketch the grounds often given for claiming the great influence of the article. These are the data with which the
critics need to deal. The critical approach is represented by many
scholars and has been made on many levels of analysis. Three different
statements, in combination, capture the essence of the critique. I will
structure my own analysis of the law and its desirability around these
three theses.
The Warren and Brandeis article was published in 1890. After an
initially slow progress,"' recognition of the right to privacy gained momentum. By 1960, when Prosser published his influential analysis,19 all
but four states recognized the tort, the Restatement (First) of Torts
included it, and the tort, discussed and analyzed in hundreds of judicial decisions, was seen as an integral part of tort law. 20 Then, in 1965

the Griswold v. Connecticut2 1 decision launched, and its progeny has
since integrated, the constitutional right to privacy. This right now encompasses such diverse items as wiretapping and Fourth Amendment

18. This was highlighted by judicial rejection of the cause of action in Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), and followed by a public outcry
that resulted in a legislated and limited right to privacy.
19. Prosser, supra note 17.

20. For a summary description of the development, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
OF TORTS § 117, at 849-51 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter

PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
PROSSER & KEETON].

21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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decisions 22; personal decisions in the area of family life, contraception,
2
23
abortion and marriage ; and watching pornography in one's home.

4

If one looks under "protection of privacy" in contemporary American jurisprudence, one will find a large variety of legal measures-civil,
criminal, and constitutional-all designed to promote and protect privacy. It is therefore easy to conclude that the law gave Warren and
Brandeis's idea an enthusiastic reception.
Against this background we need to look at the critique of their
effort. As mentioned above, this critique consists of three different
themes.
First, when we look at situations in which the courts granted a
remedy in tort for invasion of privacy, often relying on the Warren and
Brandeis article, we find that the courts gave remedies in four different
types of situations involving four different interests: Intrusion, appropriation, false light, and public disclosure of private facts. Warren and
Brandeis were concerned with only the latter. Their article therefore
generated a body of law that obscured important distinctions, and only
one part of this body of law responded to the problem they identified.
In fact, we do not have a tort of invasion of privacy, but instead have
four distinct and different torts, three of which have nothing to do with
privacy.25

Second, the defense of newsworthiness or public interest meant
that plaintiffs rarely won for pure disclosure of true private facts. Usually, plaintiffs won cases that involved other elements such as intrusion, illegal acquisition of information, commercial exploitation, or
falsehood. Furthermore, this cause of action is likely to be unconstitutional because it is not clear that truthful publications can ever be actionable under the First Amendment. Therefore, the only tort that responds to Warren and Brandeis's concerns is at best marginal and at
worst unconstitutional. Moreover, predicting when a plaintiff might
win is extremely difficult. Occasionally, plaintiffs win for trivial reasons. Thus, although the availability of a cause of action deters speech,
22. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a recent analysis of cases, see
Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy": An Emerging
Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077 (1987).
23. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.

479 (1965).
24. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
25. This line of analysis has become famous and influential primarily through its
exposition by Prosser. See Prosser, supra note 17. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
incorporated a version of this analysis. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 652
(1977). Most courts and scholars now use this as the standard analysis of privacy law.
However, the idea did not originate with Prosser. See, e.g., Frederick Davis, What Do
We Mean by "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D. L. REV. 1 (1959); Gerald Dickler, The Right of
Privacy: A Proposed Redefinition, 70 U.S. L. REv. 435 (1936).
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speech.2
Third, the constitutional right to privacy is indeed an exceptionally important part of the law. There is, however, no connection whatsoever between this constitutional right, its underlying rationale, and
the tort of public disclosure of private facts that was advocated by
Warren and Brandeis. 27 The use of the same label has created confusion rather than illumination. Warren and Brandeis's right to privacy
was in fact denied constitutional status in decisions such as Time, Inc.
v. Hill,28 in which the Court applied the actual malice test required in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan21 to false light privacy cases.
The conclusion is that, at best, the impact of the analysis is the
creation of a tort in which plaintiffs rarely win and that might be unconstitutional. All the other parts of the so-called privacy law may be
traced in part to the successful rhetoric of Warren and Brandeis, but
they do not reflect a positive response to their concerns. Many feel that
their analysis confused issues and obscured the fact that so-called privacy claims involved different issues.
These critical descriptive theses all have grains of truth in them.
However, they also are extremely misleading. Unfortunately, they have
now become very influential and reinforce the acceptance of their ade30
quacy as descriptions and in turn affect the development of the law.

26. Kalven and Zimmerman mounted the most systematic criticisms in this direction. See Kalven, supra note 2; Zimmerman, supra note 2.
27. For one of the many recent discussions of the constitutional right that explicitly makes this point, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HASv. L. REv. 737
(1989).
28. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
29. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30. The law of privacy therefore reflects at least twice the complicated relationship
between descriptions or analyses of the law and its development. Warren and Brandeis
themselves did precisely that. Their success in persuading some courts that the common
law did protect privacy and their descriptive analysis led many courts to declare a legal
remedy for the invasion of privacy. Prosser's presumed analysis of past decisions then
crystallized into a definitive formulation of the law, thus affecting its development. For
example, Prosser's analysis left out of the law of privacy the disclosure of intimate information to a limited audience. The disclosure is not an intrusion, often it is not an appropriation, and it is not a "public disclosure of private facts." However, this appears to be
a strange result that is not justified by any principled analysis and seriously limits the
capacity of the law to deal with important invasions of privacy that do not involve a
conflict with freedom of the press, as distinct from the freedom of speech of individuals.
It is interesting to note that the law, to some extent, found a way around this anomaly.
The first edition of Prosser on Torts to appear after Prosser's death repeated his four
torts thesis, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 117, at 851, and called the relevant
tort "public disclosure of private facts," id. at 856, but explicitly acknowledged that
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The following is a condensed
version of an alternative description
31
of the American law of privacy.
First, many of the remedies given for invasions of privacy under
intrusion, appropriation, and false light claims in fact reflect a wish to
protect privacy and do respond to Warren and Brandeis's original concerns. Some decisions that granted relief under categories such as
property or freedom from the intentional infliction of mental distress
addressed these same concerns.
Many of the first cases in which courts granted remedies for invasion of privacy involved the use of names or pictures in commercial
advertisements. It was easy to classify them as cases of appropriation.
It is even true that in some of these cases, although this happened only
later, the plaintiffs really were not concerned with their privacy. The
issue was not the wish to avoid publicity, but the wish to be paid for
the use of their names or pictures. In most of these cases, however, a
primary motivation was an interest in privacy.32

This is even clearer in intrusion cases. Intrusion may be, and often

is, an obvious invasion of privacy.3 3 Furthermore, in many of the pri-

neither logic nor all the cases accepted the requirement that the disclosure be public, see
id. at 857-58.
31. Bloustein has argued forcefully and persistently for this alternative view. See
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U L. REV. 962 (1964); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and UnconstitutionalAs Well?, 46 TEX.
L. REv. 611 (1968) [hereinafter Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution]. For
an extended critique of reductionist analyses of the law of privacy in general and Prosser's account in particular, see Ruth Gavison, Privacy and Its Legal Protection (1975)
(unpublished D. Phil., thesis, Oxford University) (on file at Oxford, Yale, and Harvard
Universities).
32. Professor Post documents in some detail the development of the tort of appropriation and the oscillation between elements of privacy and pure elements of property.
See Post, supra note 4. The right to publicity first appeared in 1953. Pavesich v. New
England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), is a classic example of an appropriation case in which the plaintiff was not a celebrity, there was no commercial value to the
use of his picture, and the basis of the relief was a violation of privacy.
Celebrities also are interested, at times, not in benefiting from some commercial use
of their pictures, but in preventing it altogether for reasons of human dignity. The discussion of appropriation is further confused by the fact that in some states, notably New
York, the basis of the right to privacy is an appropriation-like statute. See N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1992). Courts that wanted to provide a remedy in
cases that did not neatly fall within this definition of cases, such as invasions of privacy
by noncommercial publication, therefore had to find routes other than mere privacy in
order to justify a remedy.
33. One of the classic illustrations is a case that preceded the Warren and Brandeis
analysis. See De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881). In De May the court granted
a remedy for trespass when a person intruded upon the plaintiff's childbirth. Id. at 149;
see also Byfield v. Candler, 125 S.E. 905, 906 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924) ("A passenger upon a
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vacy cases the crux of the complaint was not the injury to an interest
in property as Prosser suggests. Instead, property was used as a way to

protect privacy. Warren and Brandeis clearly thought that intrusions
into the privacy of the home, either in order to acquire information for
publication or for other reasons, were invasions of privacy. Moreover,

Prosser's analysis of the intrusion cases is very telling. He started by
saying that intrusion is very different from appropriation.3 4 He then
proceeded to say that acquisition of information or its publication in
public places is no intrusion, but added the following qualification:
"And even in a public place, there can be some things which are still
private, so that a woman who is photographed with her dress unexpect-

edly blown up in a 'fun house' has a right of action." 35
Finally, the false light cases are wrongly classified as truly cases of

defamation that protect the accuracy of one's portrayal and reputation.
This classification obscures the important difference between the two

interests that Warren and Brandeis identified. In fact, the two false
light cases that reached the Supreme Court are good illustrations of

this point.36 In both cases the real gravamen of the complaint was not
the inaccuracy of the portrayal, but the fact that it was made. The

plaintiffs had to stress the falsehood because they were told that they
could not recover unless the publication was false. But this was a legal
constraint that did not reflect the essence of the case. The remedies,
when given, affirmed the interests of people not to be depicted in the
press without a legitimate public interest. 37 In fact, treating cases in

vessel is entitled to the privacy of the room to which he or she has been assigned .
34. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, § 117, at 854-56.
35. Id. at 856 (citing Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964)).
The Graham case obviously is a case of "public disclosure of private facts," according to
Prosser's own classification. If any such disclosure is an intrusion, the distinction between the two categories disappears. I think an important difference exists between intrusions and disclosures because only the latter clashes directly with free speech. However, an important similarity also exists: they are both invasions of the same interest
individuals have in privacy.
36. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
37. Cf. Diane L. Zimmerman, False .Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That
Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 364, 383-91 (1989). Zimmerman agreed that the analogy between defamation and privacy is misleading, id. at 393, but wished to deduce from that
conclusion that defamation law is better grounded than privacy law and that states
should eliminate false light as a cause of action because it is not sufficiently similar to
defamation, id. at 452. I believe, along with Warren and Brandeis, that privacy should be
considered as an independent candidate for protection because it is different from defamation. The confusion in the literature and cases is partly related to the New York statute. See supra note 32; see also Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Damages and the Privacy Tort:
Sketching a "Legal Profile", 64 IOWA L. REv. 1111, 1121-22 (1979) (pointing out that in
Cantrell the damages award reflected the seriousness of the invasion of privacy through

Published by Scholar Commons, 1992

13

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
43
South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1992], Art.[Vol.
3

which the essence of the violation is a privacy invasion according to the
38
rules of defamation is inadequate.
Warren and Brandeis's analysis therefore is responsible for initiating most of the tort remedies for invasion of privacy, and their argument might have been helpful in developing the law of intentional infliction of emotional harm as well. In most cases these remedies do
respond to their concerns. The reductionist analysis therefore is misleading both as a description of the law and as a framework for its
development. The main distortion of the reductionist analysis to the
initial Warren and Brandeis analysis is not in the details of the cause

accurate report, although the falsehood was used to allow recovery in the face of the
assumption that truth should have been a defense as it would be in cases of defamation).
The limited influence of law reviews is apparent because a number of commentators
immediately pointed out this problem. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to
Speak from Times to Time: FirstAmendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied
to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935 (1968). The uniqueness of privacy may become clearer
when we recall that the law of defamation covers only disparaging statements, whereas
the interest in privacy is not limited in the same way. See Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining
and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion of Privacy, 41 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 885 (1991).
38. In the constitutional development of defamation law the balancing between
reputation and free speech involves two sets of variables: (1) The nature of the information and the identity of the plaintiff and (2) the falsity of the information. Because falsehood is irrelevant to privacy claims, these defamation decisions are not much help in
deciding privacy cases. Moreover, even the classification of cases on a public-private
spectrum does not help. The most private of the defamation cases may not raise any
privacy problems. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985). On the other hand, some cases that are treated as defamation actions may
raise privacy concerns. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). Dun &
Bradstreet dramatically illustrates Warren and Brandeis's insistence that the interests
are different. It dealt with credit information that the defendant disseminated in the
ordinary course of his business. The only problem with the information was that it happened to be wrong. On the other hand, invasions of privacy concern the publication of
items that should not have been published at all. The details of the divorce trial of Ms.
Firestone belong in this group. For an analysis of the interests behind defamation and
privacy, see Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation
and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 691 (1986); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957
(1989) [hereinafter Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy].
In addition to the different types of harm caused by some injuries to reputation and
some injuries to privacy, a major difference exists between the two possible remedies.
While an injury to reputation by false disclosure can and should be amended by a correction, no analogous way exists to amend an injury to privacy. This is another reason why
Dun & Bradstreet seems to be wrongly decided. The error was based on a mistake that
was corrected immediately and effectively. Liability, especially punitive damages, seems
to have been wrongly imposed. Dun & Bradstreet does raise one issue of privacy: The
Court apparently punished the defendant because he refused to disclose the list of firms
that received the original statement.
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of action,'9 but rather in the analysis of its grounds. Warren and Brandeis were fighting the specter of a cheapened and standardized society,
a society in which the most noble aspirations of man were belittled.
For Warren and Brandeis unwanted publicity of intimate details was
just one way in which a society could reach that lamentable state. Intrusions and publicity were objectionable partly because of their inhibiting effect on freedom and perceived affront to dignity. Prosser's analysis left the justification for the private facts tort at the level of mental
distress, which is often trivial, petty, and abusive.40
Second, it is not true that once one clarifies the picture, legal remedies for the publication of true information about individuals are almost nonexistent and probably unconstitutional. It is true that in
many dramatic privacy cases courts have denied recovery to plaintiffs,
for whom the courts had some sympathy, because of the publication's
newsworthiness or public interest. 41 It is true that since 1975 the Supreme Court has refused on four occasions to grant relief for embarrassing disclosure of true facts 2 and that at least one justice expressed
the opinion that truth should always be a defense for the press under

39. These exist, however, and are not trivial. I already have mentioned some implications of the four torts analysis. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Additionally, Prosser's analysis cannot deal adequately with any of the many privacy threats created by computerized information systems. Even the critics of the private facts tort
acknowledge this as a threat to privacy. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 362.
Warren and Brandeis's analysis definitely could have encompassed this threat by, for
example, developing limitations on acquisition, accumulation, and disclosure of information related to such data banks. The four torts analysis is much less susceptible to such a
development of the law. This creates an unnecessary discrepancy between the scope of
the law labeled privacy law and its functions in social life.
40. Analyses such as Bloustein's were not influential. We shall have to wait and see
whether attempts at reidentifying the essence of the tort remedy of the kind that Post
offered will fare better. See Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy, supra note 38.
Post argued that the real purpose of privacy rules is to protect the sense of civility,
which is itself a defining feature of communities and selves. Post's nonreductionist analysis of privacy is superior to Prosser's, but I think Post also failed to do full justice to the
many functions that privacy serves in our lives. Although civility is important, more is at
stake when privacy is invaded. However, Post is committed, unlike Prosser, Kalven, and
Zimmerman, to the view that invasions of privacy are serious losses and threats to important social goals.
41. The most dramatic one is Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), is another
example. In the Hill case there was a powerful dissent that urged a decision in Hill's
favor. Id. at 411-20 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
42. The first case was Cox Broadcasting Publications v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
The most recent was Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). For a discussion of the
series of decisions, see Peter Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of
Justice Black, 68 Tix. L. REv. 1195 (1990).
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the First Amendment. 48 It also is true that the lines demarcated by the
Supreme Court in these cases would have made recovery unlikely for
plaintiffs in some of the situations in which they did recover under tort
law.4" Finally, at least two states explicitly rejected the private facts
45

tort.

But this is only a part of the picture. There are strong dissents in
a number of Supreme Court privacy cases, and the decisions that denied recovery were often met with critical commentary. 46 Some plaintiffs have won for public disclosure of true facts, including some recent
cases, despite explicit and powerful arguments on behalf of the press
and the importance of freedom of expression. 47 The sentiments that

43. Cox Broadcasting Publications v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 497-500 (1975) (Powell,
J., concurring).
44. According to present decisions, liability could be imposed only if a statute exists that explicitly prohibits the publication of some true information (such as the identity of rape victims, the type of publication involved in both Cohn and Florida Star), the
court holds that this statute is not unconstitutional, and the information was not voluntarily, even if mistakenly released by the government. The Supreme Court has explicitly
refused to pronounce these statutes unconstitutional. In fact, in the wake of the William
Kennedy Smith rape case a lower court in Florida has held that a statute which makes
disclosure of rape victims an offense is unconstitutional. See Michael Crook, Tabloid
Charges May Be Dropped, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 17, 1991, at lB. It appears, however,
that the classic privacy cases which allowed recovery, such as Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91
(Cal. Ct. App. 1931); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983);
and Briscoe v. Readers' Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971) (en banc), could not survive
this test of constitutionality. On the other hand, the Supreme Court decisions have not
addressed problems relating to lapse of time, although the decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967), may suggest that this might not work in favor of plaintiffs. One
possible exception might be Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942), in which
the information was gathered by trespassing into the plaintiff's hospital room.
45. Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988); Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Cos.,
712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986) (en banc) (relying on Kalven and Zimmerman's critiques of the
tort). In Hall the concurring opinion suggested that the cause of action should be recognized, but that no remedy should be given in the instant case because of the public
interest in publication. 372 S.E.2d at 717 (Frye, J., concurring).
46. Both Hill, 385 U.S. at 411-20 (Fortas, J., dissenting), and Florida Star, 491
U.S. at 542-53 (White, J., dissenting), contain such dissents. For criticisms of these decisions and their reasoning, see Edelman, supra note 42; Nimmer, supra note 37. See also
Barbara L. Pedersen, Case Note, Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Rape of the Right to Privacy, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 731 (1990); Marta G. Stanton, Comment, The Wrongful
Obliteration of the Tort of Invasion of Privacy Through the Publication of Private
Facts, 18 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 391 (1991).
47. Cases in which the courts were sympathetic to privacy complaints include Huskey v. NBC, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (mem.); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune,
Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983); and Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros.,
492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985). It is somewhat surprising that the defendants in these cases
did not make constitutional challenges in view of the decision in Cohn. The reports of
these cases may indeed be unintentionally misleading. They mostly are rejections of motions for summary dismissal. They probably were either settled or lost in some later
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privacy is an important value that should be balanced against free
speech and that the category of cases in which privacy might override
free speech is not empty are echoed by many and are reflected by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.48 The Supreme Court has been extremely cautious and has not held that any recovery for truthful publication is inconsistent with the First Amendment. In addition, concerns
with privacy are prevalent in editorial policies and decisions. The number of cases in which plaintiffs have won is not the only, and probably
not the most important, index of success. More important is the scope
of situations in which editors refrain from publishing for reasons of
privacy, either because they have internalized the importance of the
value or because they are afraid of legal, public, or professional
49
criticism.

The legal and social response to the narrowest of their concerns,
the one that the public disclosure tort addresses, is not that of a clear
rejection. It seems that Warren and Brandeis would have wanted some
of the plaintiffs who have lost over the years to win, but arguably there
is not that much of a difference between their profile of the tort and
the Restatement's. 0 For some critics this may be just restating the

stage of the litigation, as seems to have happened in the famous case of Briscoe v. Readers' Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971) (en banc).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D special note (1976).

49. One can quarrel, of course, with the details of these policies. I do not want to
enlist the presumed views of Warren and Brandeis. Today, many doubt the wisdom and
the morality of exposing the sex lives and the minor childhood transgressions of political
candidates. For my purposes here, however, it is sufficient to say that even within the
journalistic profession the prevalent approach is that publication of privacy-invading
material should be justified. Journalists may be quick to find relevance and justification,
but most of them accept in principle that some justification must exist. See infra part
IV.
50. Section 652D of the Restatement defines the private facts tort as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of the kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976).
The difference between profiles is in the guidelines given to help apply this standard
of legitimate public concern. Warren and Brandeis talked mainly about explicit consent
and political candidates as public figures, who may expect less privacy than anonymous
individuals. On the other hand, the definition of the Restatement is much broader:
One who voluntarily places himself in the public eye, by engaging in public
activities, or by assuming a prominent role in institutions or activities having
general economic, cultural, social or similar public interest, or by submitting
himself or his work for public judgment, cannot complain when he is given
publicity that he has sought, even though it may be unfavorable to him. . ..
[T]he legitimate interest of the public in [such an] individual may extend be-
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problem; they probably think that the Restatement, and the law it reflects, should be modified. But for other critics, including Prosser and
many staunch supporters of the First Amendment and its values, all
that is needed is to carefully draw the lines that are required by close
attention to the importance of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press.51
Third, the tort-law right to privacy and the constitutional right to
privacy share important concerns. The use of the same term, although
it may obscure some important differences between cases, does identify
similarities that are no less important. It generally is true that judges
and commentators see the constitutional right to privacy as different
and distinct from the tort that Warren and Brandeis advocated. 52
The picture blurs, however, on closer examination. Blood tests,
self-incrimination, searches, and wiretapping, which are all instances
concerning constitutional privacy, clearly raise issues similar to the
fear of intrusion and compelled disclosure of the privacy tort.53 Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States"4 was very similar to parts

yond those matters which are themselves made public, and to some reasonable
extent may include information as to matters that would otherwise be private.
Id. cmt. e.
The Restatement then proceeds to identify "involuntary public figures," who may
become newsworthy without seeking publicity. Id. cmt. f. Similarly, the Restatement
suggests that the ultimate decisionmaker on legitimate public concern is the community
itself. It therefore may give more credence to curiosity and demand than Warren and
Brandeis would have been willing to give.
51. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 142-43, 302

(1989); Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329 (1979).
52. The Supreme Court has refused to grant privacy constitutional status in the
sense of freedom from publication or the interest in reputation. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589 (1977) (holding that a law which required reporting and identifying customers of
drugs involves tort privacy but does not raise constitutional privacy issues under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (refusing to base a remedy
for disclosure of the fact that petitioner was arrested for shoplifting on the constitutional
right to privacy). In Paul three justices dissented and claimed that the interests in reputation and the presumption of innocence are values of a constitutional status. 424 U.S. at
734 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Many commentators treat the two types of privacy as completely different. See, e.g.,
Rubenfeld, supra note 27; Zimmerman, supra note 2. However, others treat all legal protection of privacy, tort, and constitutional aspects as if they belong to the same cluster of
concerns. See, e.g., Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution, supra note 31;
Emerson, supra note 51; Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233
(1977).
53. Therefore, it is no surprise that in Prosser's discussion of the intrusion cases
many of the examples are related precisely to these types of cases. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 20, § 117, at 854-56.
54. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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of the 1890 article. 55 The liberty-privacy cases started by building on
emanations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but soon established
their own direction and rhetoric. 56 Despite these connections, the development of the constitutional right of privacy has not affected the
privacy tort much. As we saw, the Court has not given privacy, in the
sense of freedom from unwanted publicity, a constitutional basis. Such
a basis might have given privacy a better chance when it conflicted
with the newly constitutionalized public interest defense to publication
torts. It also would contribute to the sense that the two interests are, in
an important way, aspects of one and the same concern.",
This may be another achievement of Prosser's reductive analysis
of the tort, which disregarded Warren and Brandeis's and the courts'
sense that privacy was a coherent interest that has to do with human
dignity. This disassociation between the tort and the constitutional
right stemmed mainly from the fact that, as many commentators noticed, the Court seemed to invoke the constitutional right to privacy in
order to address issues of liberty, such as issues of freedom from interference, as opposed to issues of freedom from intrusion, attention,
scrutiny, and publicity, which were the center of concerns with privacy.
I am among those who think that the distinction between these
two interests is important and that a good way to maintain the distinction is by labeling the latter as privacy interests and the former as liberty interests. However, I am sorry if this has led to a failure to see

55. Olmstead involved a conviction for smuggling liquor during the prohibition.

The evidence was acquired through wiretapping. The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not cover the use of listening devices without trespass. Id. at 466.
Brandeis, who dissented, extolled the importance of the privacy of the home. Id. at 47185 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis's position was later accepted by the Court in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Douglas took special
care to note that a prohibition of the use of contraceptives would entitle the police to
monitor the bedrooms of married couples, id. at 485, a paradigmatic invasion of privacy
that was only indirectly related to the limitation of liberty involved. This attenuated
connection between privacy and liberty disappeared altogether when the right to privacy
was invoked to legalize interracial marriages.
57. An obvious reluctance by the Court to see privacy in the sense of freedom from
publicity as a constitutional right is exhibited in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) and
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). The Cox-FloridaStar line of cases also exhibits this
reluctance. However, other tendencies may be reflected in other contexts. See, e.g.,
United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 485 U.S.
1005 (1988) (holding that the privacy exemption to the Freedom of Information Act includes criminal records). For a suggestion that the constitutional nature of privacy would
not change the type of balancing involved, see Braun v. City of Tafts, 154 Cal. App. 3d

332 (1984) (holding that the fact that the right to privacy was incorporated into the state
constitution did not change the nature of the balance between public interest and
privacy).
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that these two distinct values are closely interrelated. One of the main
functions of privacy is its crucial contribution to liberty. A society
without privacy, in the more limited sense, likely will not enjoy much
freedom or have robust individuals who are willing to experiment,
dare, and challenge their governments and the positive morality of
their societies. The constitutional right to privacy is different from the
interests that the privacy tort protects, but both are inspired by the
same ideal of individuals and societies and by the fear of the same
specter-that of a totalitarian and leveling organization of society.5"
Therefore, at least on the level of importance and status, the conflict
between privacy and free speech should be seen as a conflict between
two ideals of the same level and not between the most sacred constitutional principle and a suspect, trivial, and petty tort.
In summary, although a general agreement exists that the number
of successful plaintiffs under the disclosure of private facts category
never has been substantial, there is considerable controversy concerning the implications of this agreement to the impact and the validity of
the Warren and Brandeis analysis. Some commentators believe that
the tort is merely a confusing myth. In direct opposition to the Warren
and Brandeis analysis, these commentators also believe that we will be
better off if we acknowledge that there should be no liability for truthful publications. Others believe that we shall lose something significant
if we reach this conclusion and that freedom from unwanted publicity
and robust public debate can be made consistent without giving up all
privacy protection, thus vindicating the general approach of Warren
and Brandeis even if not the particulars of their analysis. In the last
part of this paper I wish to explain why I want to join this latter group.
IV.

TOWARDS A BETTER ANALYSIS OF THE PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH
CONFLICT

The desirable legal resolution of a conflict between two values is
very complex. It involves a large number of questions, which belong to
different discourses. First, we need to have a clear analysis of the two
competing values involved, what they are, why they are desirable, and
how they relate to each other. This may require some conceptual analysis and a lot of moral and human understanding of the ways in which
ideals and goals work in our lives and affect other goals that we have as

58. Both parts of the argument-the importance of maintaining a distinction be-

tween being free from observation and publicity and being free from regulation, and the
pervasive relationships between the justifications of privacy and the ideals of freedom,

autonomy, and human flourishing-appear in Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 YALE LJ. 421 (1980).
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individuals and a society. When we proceed to discuss conflicts between rights, values, or interests, it is crucial that we not lose sight of
what we have learned in the first stage by analyzing the different values. We should remember this because situations of conflict are painful. Therefore, we have a tendency, once we have resolved the conflict
as we must, to undervalue what we have given up in order to be at
peace with the decision that we have adopted.
The resolution of conflicts is undertaken in the context of some
ethical and meta-ethical framework. What should be counted? What
weight should be given to wishes, ideals, goals, and interests? How do
we identify them? In a pluralistic society of the type in which we live,
disagreement is likely on many parts of these frameworks. Such disagreements may impede our chances of gaining consensus on the moral
resolution of conflicts between values. Nonetheless, agreement on at
least some working assumptions, both substantive and methodological,
may be possible. As a substantive starting point I suggest the principle
that harming other individuals or society should be justified. 59 I do not
impose constraints on what can count as a justification at this point.
Methodologically, I suggest two distinctions. One is between first-order
and second-order arguments for the resolution of conflicts. The other is
between the morality of an issue and its legal resolution.
My argument, in a nutshell, is that the resolution of conflicts is
likely to be more adequate if we heed these guidelines for discussing
conflicts. Identifying the conflicting interests and their justifications,
identifying the kinds of harms caused by infringement of these values,
and attending to the distinctions between first- and second-order justifications and between the morality of some behavior and its legal status all help in resolving these conflicts. Moreover, Warren and Brandeis's analysis is closer to this desirable model than many of the
judicial opinions in the field and many of the analyses that criticize
their seminal argument.
Many of the weaknesses of discussions on the free speech and privacy conflict consist of insufficient attention to certain points. The justified fear of curbing free speech results in inattention to both the
acute harmfulness of some invasions of privacy and to the relative inapplicability of some general justifications of free speech to privacy. 60

59. I leave out the more controversial question concerning harm to self.
60. This problem is not unique to the free speech and privacy conflict. It is encountered in many other areas of conflict between free speech and other values such as reputation, equality, and dignity threatened by hate and racist speech. A similar argument
against free speech rhetoric is made by feminists in their attempt to regulate pornogra-

phy. Although important differences exist between these issues, there also is an important structural similarity between them. Decisions for speech should be made on an informed basis, taking into full account the costs of such decisions in terms of other values.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1992

21

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
43
South Carolina Law Review,REVIEW
Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1992], Art.[Vol.
3

Moreover, it leads to an overemphasis on the conflict between the two
values without attention to the interrelationships between them-the
ways in which they belong together and reinforce each other.
The same fear of legal remedies that might chill worthy expression
and considerations that concern difficulties of enforcement and fear of
abuse61 justify a second-order argument for some protection of unworthy speech in some areas. They also may justify the refusal to make
speech actionable even if it is seen as morally objectionable. There is
an enormous difference, however, between this kind of an argument for
the legality of all privacy-invading speech and an argument that such
speech is morally desirable or at least permissible. The difference occurs on a number of levels. The rhetoric and the attitude of the law
towards the victim of an unjustified invasion of privacy who will lose in
court should be sympathetic because the victim is required to pay a
heavy price for the good of us all. 62 The extralegal difference is even
more important. If losses of privacy are insignificant and morally permissible, there is no need for any educational or attitudinal effort to
minimize such losses. If, on the other hand, such losses are not made
actionable because of second-order considerations or because of the
limits of the law, we should all try to attain the proper balance between privacy and free speech by minimizing unjustified invasions of
privacy. The two current journalistic debates about outing and the
publication of the names of rape victims make this point most dramatically. Most accept that there is no legal remedy for most cases of such
publications, and many accept that this is as it should be. There is,
however, a vibrant debate within the press and within the community
about the morality of such publications.13

Although many of the flaws in the analysis tend to support speech in situations in which
such support seems questionable, they may well lead to unjustified limitations on speech.
I believe, for example, that the decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), is wrong because it creates too much liability for speech
and that the award in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), was much too large. I
want to clarify that I think that the Court's decisions on the whole are better than their
reasoning and opinions. My quarrel is mainly with the jurisprudence of the First Amendment, not with particular decisions.
61. The best way to protect privacy after publication is not to start a long court
proceeding that publicizes the initial publication. Laws that protect against unjustified
invasions of privacy may be used to inhibit and discourage justified publications.
62. The justifiability of the invasion may not affect the pain of the losing plaintiff,
and it is always important to be sensitive to this pain. There is a difference, however,
between a plaintiff who is losing because the first-order claim in favor of publication is
stronger and a plaintiff subjected to an unjustified invasion that we decide not to make
actionable because of second-order considerations. The defense of judges that express
these kinds of judgments goes much beyond the confines of the present paper.
63. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, The Third Rape, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1991, at M1
(criticizing the press practices that followed NBC's and the New York Times's disclosure
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A full defense of my position would require a detailed account of
an answer to a number of questions including: Under what circumstances are invasions of privacy prima facie unjustifiable? When justifications exist, mainly the suggestive but elusive legitimate public interests that might override privacy at the first-order level, what, if any,
are the second-order justifications for allowing free speech even when
it does or is likely to unjustifiably invade privacy? Do the limits of law
and fear of abuse require even more protection of the press than suggested by these second-order arguments? These are fascinating questions, on many levels.6 4 They are complex, and many of them are extremely controversial. Sincere supporters of free speech can and do
take different positions on these issues.6 5 I have addressed these questions in some detail. 66 Because I cannot do justice to the subject here, I
have decided to limit my argument to the claim that something has
gone importantly wrong with the way we think about the privacy and
free speech conflict. Let me elaborate on these points.
A.

Losing Sight of the Importance of Privacy

Americans are justly proud of their free speech jurisprudence,
which reflects a deep commitment to the importance of this value. Yet
this pride is quite consistent with the observation that free speech
analysis is not always what we would hope for. Nonetheless, there is
broad agreement that freedom of expression is crucial to democracy, to
a free society, and to the constitutional design of the United States.
Judicial opinions and the literature abound with references to the justifications for free speech and the dangers that might be encountered if
free speech is curbed. There is a strong, almost irrebuttable, presumption in favor of freedom of speech.
I would not want this to be any different. Freedom of speech is
very important. We must stress the need to protect freedom of speech
against all kinds of attempts at repression and censorship. Nonethe-

of the name of the woman that was the alleged victim in the William Kennedy Smith

Palm Beach case).
64. Notice, for example, that I have not taken a position on the question whether

the conflict should be resolved by ad-hoc balancing or by principled balancing or
whether and how such balancing can be done.
65. Compare Kalven, supra note 2, at 327 (concluding that there should be no protection of privacy) with Emerson, supra note 51, at 359 (concluding that there should be

a legal remedy at least for cases in which the disclosure is blatant and its relevance to
the need of the public to know is minuscule or speculative).
66. See Ruth Gavison, The Prohibition of Privacy-Invading Publications: The

Right to Privacyand the Right of the Public to Know, in CIVIL RIGHTS IN
IN HONOUR OF H.H. CONN. 177 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1982) (Heb.).
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less, we need to remind decisionmakers that losses of privacy are intensely harmful, that they are harmful in a variety of ways that affect
both individuals and the societies in which they live, and that freedom
of expression is so important because of its relationship to the kind of
individuals that we want to have and the kind of society in which we
want to live. In order to have that very society, we need more than
freedom of speech. We need other forms of freedoms, virtues, and aspirations. Privacy is not merely another important value that occasionally conflicts with free expression. Privacy is essential, in different
ways, to the very same goals that we seek to pursue through freedom of
67
expression.

While the legal literature has discussed the importance of privacy,68 the main support for privacy's importance comes from philosophical and psychological literature.6 9 There is an agreement that pri-

67. See Ruth Gavison, Information Control: Availability and Exclusion, in PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 113 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983) (discussing the immanence of the conflict to the ideals of autonomous individuals and free societies). The same position is endorsed by Thomas Emerson, one of the most outspoken and
consistent defenders of free speech. He says that privacy must be allowed a place in the
American system of individual rights and that an accommodation with free speech must
be found that allows limited legal remedies for publication of true intimate information.
Emerson, supra note 51, at 332-49. Emerson wrote:
[T]he areas of conflict between the right to privacy and freedom of the press
are quite limited . . . . At most points the law of privacy and the law sustaining a free press do not contradict each other. On the contrary, they are
mutually supportive, in that both are vital features of the basic system of individual rights.
Id. at 331.
68. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
35-53 (1988); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968). This literature discussed
privacy as fundamental to individual and social freedom, sanity, and growth and emphasized the contribution of privacy to basic human relations such as trust, friendship, and
love. See also Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy,supra note 38 (stressing the role
that rules of privacy and defamation may have in maintaining the civility which is definitive and constitutive of communities that provide, in turn, an important part of an individual's self-image and self-respect).
69. See, e.g., CARL D. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE, AND PRIVACY (1977); Stanley I.
Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NoMos XIII: PRIVACY 1 (John W.
Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1971); James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4
PHIL, & PuB. AFF. 323 (1975); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,6
PHIL, & PUB. AFF. 26 (1976); Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology of Privacy, 73 Am. J.
Soc. 741 (1968). The justifications for privacy may be discussed in either of two ways.
One is to specify how invasions of privacy are harmful; the other is to describe the functions of privacy in our life. In many ways the two are similar. Frustrating an important
function in our life is often harmful. However, this is not always the case, and the differences may be relevant in the following way: Harm usually refers to a perceived sense of
being harmed. The sense of injury may be intense for one person when another would
not feel offended and presumably when no acknowledged function of privacy has been
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vacy is intimately connected to freedom and autonomy in a variety of
ways. In many situations our freedom is not protected by the absence
of regulation and its chilling social effect, but by the fact that we enjoy
privacy, either in the sense of being alone or intimate with others, to
behave in ways that would be unlikely in public. When this behavior is
desirable or permissible, privacy acts to enlarge our freedom in an unproblematic way. This may include many types of conduct that require
intimacy or spontaneity and provide valuable learning experiences. If
we have to think that everything we do is observed and may be publicized, we shall have poorer lives.10 We also shall have less of a tendency
to do the things that we are not sure about, fewer chances to experiment and acquire competence through trial and error, and fewer opportunities to experiment with behaving differently. The losses of these
expansions of freedom may be great for both individuals and societies.
I doubt that we could have many great pianists if individuals could
practice only under the scrutiny of their not-always-sympathetic peers.
Privacy also is helpful for other types of unlikely behavior that are
desirable, indeed essential, to our ideal society. An obvious example is
the secrecy of the ballot. Ideally, people should have courage in their
convictions and be able to vote publicly in the same manner in which
they vote privately. But often this will not occur. We prefer the secrecy
of the ballot, with its opportunities for abuse and hypocrisy, to simple
public accountability.
Democracy, one of the strongest justifications for free speech, is
related to privacy in additional ways and is justified by a variety of
arguments. Primary among them is the recognition of the importance
of human dignity and the wish to encourage autonomous and self-di-

frustrated. The wish to protect people against losses of privacy extends to both the perceived sense of harm and privacy's function. We do not want people to suffer humancaused pain unless it is necessary or justified. The more intense the pain, the greater the
desire to minimize it. But we also do not want people to be denied important aspects of
the good life, even if they are not aware of the contribution of these aspects to their life
and of the price that they are paying. The language of functions is more suitable for this
approach.

70. My assumption is that we shall always live in a society in which actual or anticipated exposure may cause inhibitions and that many types of conduct which are likely
to be inhibited, such as trial and the inevitable error, are desirable and crucial to a full
human life. I do not feel the need to address the difficult question of whether, in an ideal
world in which publicity creates no stigmatizing, humiliating, or crippling effects, we
would still need this function of privacy to expand our freedom. Nor will I address
whether publicity is justified to coerce individuals to come out in public in order to fight
unjustified stigmas, such as forcing the disclosure of rape victims' names to fight the
belief that rape happens only to those who provoke it and that there is something
shameful about being raped. In any event, even if all these arguments suggest that some
functions of privacy may be undesirable, functions exist that are unaffected by these
theories.
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recting individuals who will actively participate in decisions affecting
the life of their communities. These are the individuals for whose benefit we want to have a free press so that they will share in the commitment to participate in public affairs on the basis of intelligent and informed decisions. But autonomy, a sense of self-worth, and a
willingness to respect oneself and others include respect for the distinctness of individuals and for their wishes concerning their own lives.
People are unlikely to develop a tendency to exercise autonomous
judgments in an environment that does not allow for privacy. Furthermore, democracy scholars are quick to note that freedom of speech
must be complemented by freedom of association and that associations
should be protected against coerced disclosure of their membership
and of their private meetings. The privacy of associations is seen as the
road to participation in public life. Denial of that privacy will be a
threat to public life, not an enhancement of its accountability."
It therefore is striking to see many judges and commentators that
are critical of privacy so willing to discount these functions of privacy
by suggesting that the primary function of privacy in people's lives is
either the wish to effectively deceive others7 2 or some hypersensitive
and inexplicable aversion to publicity, with the loss of privacy causing
no serious harm to either individuals or society. 3 Under this approach
there will be very little willingness to sacrifice any free speech in favor
of privacy.
B. Inapplicabilityof Some General Free Speech Concerns
When one tries to resolve the tension between two values, it is
helpful in the first-order resolution to identify the scope of the conflict
before seeking the resolution. The fact that there are many ways to
protect privacy against threats that do not involve publication enforces

71. The Supreme Court conceded this important point in NAACP v. Alabama, 377
U.S. 288 (1964). For the importance of private associations and the need to protect them
even against claims of inequality, see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609

(1984).
72. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393 (1978). I do not
claim that no one has ever invoked privacy to deceive. Posner's analysis illuminated the
situations in which individuals have attempted to hide information that may affect the
behavior of others towards them. However, two points need to be made. First, a wish to
hide information is not always unjustified or deceptive. For example, when employers
hire employees based in part on irrelevant information such as sexual orientation, it

might be reasonable not to require disclosure of this information and, accordingly, not to
regard a misleading answer as undesirable deception. Second, there are important situations in which the invocation of privacy has nothing to do with the wish to avoid a
negative reaction from others.
73. See Zimmerman, supra note 37, at 367.
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the argument that privacy should give way when it conflicts with free
speech. 74 On the other hand, there are types of speech whose protection typically serves purposes that cannot be promoted by an invasion
of an individual's privacy. For these types of speech the conflict between the two values does not exist on the first-order analysis. In free
speech analysis, however, we often find a tendency to assume that all
speech performs all the many functions of free speech, so that any limitation on any speech endangers all these functions. This approach
5
may create a serious bias in favor of speech.7
One illustration of this is the typical argument supporting free
speech that a free marketplace of ideas will facilitate reaching the
truth and holding one's opinions in a nondogmatic way. Obviously, this
particular rationale cannot support the many privacy-invading statements that do not concern ideas or attempt to explain truth. To recall,
the interest that is protected is an interest in not being discussed at all,
not an interest in being known in an accurate way. Nonetheless, Zimmerman spends many pages and great energy to argue that false privacy-invading statements should not be repressed because of this argument. What we need, instead, is an argument that explains why
publicly seeking the truth about, for.example, the love life of individuals, is something morality, law, or the First Amendment should
76
protect.

74. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 51, at 332-33; Zimmerman, supra note 37, at
382. If it is possible to protect privacy adequately without imposing legal liability on
speech, this should indeed be the preferred position.
75. Again, the point is structural and goes both ways. On one hand, it may lead to
a valid argument for extending the protection of speech. On the other, it may work to
limit the protection. For example, many shops install closed-circuit televisions that mon-

itor the shop, including changing rooms, to fight and discourage shoplifting. Indignant
customers may claim that this is an invasion of their privacy. The shop will claim justification through self-interest. It would be misleading to support the customers' claims for
privacy by arguing that customers face the loss of their capacity for learning, intimacy,
spontaneity, or growth. Some violations of privacy, like constant surveillance, may indeed have these undesirable effects. However, known cameras in places that are not
designed to be areas of creativity, learning, or growth do not. Thus, some strong arguments for the importance of privacy are inapplicable to this particular instance of its
loss.
76. As indicated above, this paper does not undertake this analysis. However, the
lines along which the analysis must proceed will include the harmfulness of types of
disclosures and the relevance of such disclosures to legitimate social needs. The need to
make informed political decisions is a legitimate social need. Knowing about possibilities,
life-styles, and ways of dealing with difficulties and predicaments are extremely important. In some of these cases there may not be a need to identify the individuals concerned. In others volunteers may provide all the information that we may need to have.
There always will be the questions of whether the decision should be made by the individual concerned or by the media and whether the individual should have at least some
control over the way such disclosures are made. One area of controversy in which legisla-
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Of the four types of justification often adduced in favor of free
speech-creativity and self-expression, truth, democracy and accountability, and stability and peaceful change 17--the first usually can be
protected almost completely without an invasion of privacy. Many privacy-invasion situations do not involve any worthy pursuit of the
truth. Many of them involve no issues of relevance to democracy or to
politics, even when these terms are taken in their broadest meanings.
Most are unrelated to stability and peaceful political change.78 So, even
if we are willing to resolve all hard cases in favor of free speech, there
will be quite a number of issues in which any
first-order balancing will
79
suggest that privacy should be victorious.
C. First- and Second-Order Arguments
Many arguments suggest that, there are invasions of privacy that
are not justified by free speech concerns, but that, nonetheless, it
would be a bad policy to protect them by a general rule. In general, if
the number and frequency of cases in which privacy should override is
small, if it is difficult to identify those cases, and if a rule for ad-hoc
calculus is likely to be abused, we may be better off with a clear rule
that protects all truthful publication, so as not to endanger free

tors often adopt a proprivacy stance is the disclosure of the identity of rape victims. It is
clear why the disclosure may be extremely painful. If part of the problem with rape is
that it is perceived as shameful and a cause for guilt and if society wants to fight this
image of rape, is it not good to have women feel free to say that they were raped? Furthermore, should we not help them recognize this by paternalistically forcing them? My
intuition is that the answer is no, but this particular answer does not affect my general
discussion.
77. For a classic treatment, see THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY
OF THE FiRST AMENDMENT

1-15 (1966).

78. See, e.g., Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976). In Neff the
plaintiff's picture was taken while he was participating in a noisy support of some football team. His group was interested in the publicity and willingly posed for the picture.
However, the plaintiff was not aware that his trouser zipper was open. His picture was
singled out for publication, causing him understandable embarrassment and humiliation.
None of the classic first-order justifications of speech apply.
79. The same considerations apply to private defamation when the publicity concerns matters that are of no relevance to political questions, taken in a broad interpretation of the term. The size of this group will clearly be controversial. I confess to being
biased in favor of privacy. I do not see why the public has a right to know that X, who
grew up in her community as the daughter of B, was in fact the biological daughter of A,
who had left her years ago in B's custody. For'a case with these facts that denied recovery, see Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. Similarly, I do not think that Johnny Carson's love-life is a legitimate subject
for a press article, despite the fact that he is a public figure. But see Carson v. Allied
News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of other complexities, see supra
note 44.
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I think that none of the three conditions are met here,8 ' but this is
not my main point. If the argument against privacy is a second-order
argument,, and to some extent it is, this should affect our general approach to the subject. We cannot dismiss the plight of victims of invasions as the result of hypersensitivity or a lack of appreciation for the
virtues of free speech. These are people who are required by us to pay
a heavy price for our need to tolerate the press's freedom to publish
unjustified invasions of privacy so that it will have the power to continue and do what we must have it do: publish what we have a right
and a need to know. These victims are entitled to our sympathy and to
our apology. We should see their pain as the inevitable cost, which we
should try to minimize if we can, of living in society and human error.
Because there is no way of amending the injury, publishers should be
more willing to apologize and grant the victim vindication, even if they
fight against regarding the publication as unjustified. I am sure that I
do not need to document the claim that this is not done."2 I shall re-

80. A first-order analysis is the right decision of a particular case, taking all its
features into account, that is made within the moral and meta-moral framework adopted
by the decisionmaker. A second-order analysis is the move from the decision of a case to
the decision of a type of case by a rule. Second-order arguments have to do with the
features of the situation that is involved in the creation and the application of the rule,
expectations about the ease and clarity of the directive, and the identity of the decisionmakers under various arrangements. They are not secondary or less important. Indeed, in many circumstances they dictate an answer quite different from the one suggested by first-order arguments. The distinction may be made in many ways. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NoRMs (1975); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES (1991); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
81. As I indicated above, I think the harmfulness of invasions of privacy may be
great and that occasions of unjustified invasions of privacy are not infrequent or insubstantial. I further think that, even if cases of doubt are resolved in favor of free speech,
some invasions of privacy will be easily identified as unjustified. Finally, with some attention the dangers of abuse can be minimized. Besides, we cannot argue in favor of
abolishing the legal remedy for invasion of privacy based on the present behavior of the
press. We cannot know the extent to which blatant invasions are in fact deterred by this
law. I am confident that nothing of great value has been lost because the press was chilled by the privacy tort. The dangers of the chilling effect may be reduced by attending to
the distinction between liability and remedy, which is an avenue pursued in the context
of defamation law reform. If the media create an atmosphere in which the imposition of
liability for invasion of privacy is of sufficient deterrent effect, I see no reason against
seriously limiting the kinds of compensatory remedies available to privacy plaintiffs. On
the other hand, actual litigation costs should be afforded as an incentive to prelitigation
settlements. Finally, it might be interesting to analyze in some detail the changes in the
norms of the press toward more disclosure that cannot be related to changes in legal
norms. It appears as if the real constraints and chilling effects are generated by press
norms rather than by the law.
82. Good examples are the details about the positions taken by defendants in cases
such as Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983); Huskey v.
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turn to this point below.
D.

Morality and Legality

As explained above, a second-order justification for the permissibility of publication is very different, morally speaking, from a firstorder justification of this publication. The same applies, with greater
strength, to the move between the conclusion that some publications

which invade privacy may be morally unjustified, on the combined
first- and second-order level, and to the judgment that such invasions

of privacy should be legally actionable- 3
Some moral objectionability may be a necessary condition for legal

remedy, but it is not a sufficient condition for it. Legal constraints,
institutional considerations, and reluctance to have the government
and its machinery determine when publications should be censored
may sever the tie between immorality and illegality."4 Consequently,

the absence of a legal remedy may attest to the perceived legitimacy
and justifiability of conduct, even its desirability. It may, however, simply signify that, despite the immorality of some conduct, a legal remedy is not considered proper. Legally, at least in a narrow sense, no

difference exists between the case in which the defendant's behavior is
immoral but legal and the case in which it is both justifiable and legal.

Plaintiffs should lose in both. But the law will fail in fulfilling its social
tasks if it does not reflect the difference between these two situations

and guide defendants away from those types of conduct that may be
legal, but that are immoral and undesirable s5 Analysts of the law will

NBC, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (mem.); and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524 (1989). The media consistently argued against finding anything wrong with publication. In Florida Star the newspaper claimed that publication was fine despite the fact
that it conceded that publication was both against explicit law and against its own policies. For similar complaints against the tone and the approach of the media in cases of
private defamation, see Ronald H. Surkin, The Status of the PrivateFigure's Right to
Protect His Reputation Under the United States Constitution, 90 DIcK. L. REV. 667
(1986).
83. Some arguments against actionability may look a lot like second-order arguments about moral permissibility, especially those concerning the identity of possible
decisionmakers and their likely biases. Indeed, these may be arguments applicable at
both stages. But only the legal system brings into the question the special institutionalized features of law and the special role of government.
84. In fact, in the area of free speech we explicitly grant legal protection to a variety of immoral speech. Again, constraints of time do not permit me to argue in detail
why I agree with Warren and Brandeis that these arguments, although they have some
force, do not conclusively establish that a legal remedy for some invasions of privacy by
publication should not be recognized.
85. I am aware that this is a controversial description of the tasks of law. The point
is clearly beyond the bounds of this paper, but I am willing to defend this conception of
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fail if they do not unpack the legal bottom line to uncover the types of
considerations that motivated and required the decision.
E.

The Benefits of the Warren and Brandeis Analysis

In their seminal article Warren and Brandeis did not exhibit a full
appreciation of the important functions of publicity: the satisfaction of
curiosity and the need to give people information about life-styles and
relations. Additionally, they espoused an unduly restrictive notion of
"legitimate public interest."8 Similarly, they made too quick a move
from their conclusion that privacy is important and its violation undesirable to legal remedies. In this they acted as advocates, not as academics. Also, they created an invitation to the American legal community to experiment with legal protection of privacy. Experimentation,
elaboration, and discussion do improve their proposal.
Their approach nonetheless is basically sound: they kept in mind
the importance of both privacy and free speech and sought to find a
proper balance between them. They erred in underestimating the benefits of free speech and publicity, but to a much lesser extent than
commentators who lose sight of the importance of privacy. They conceded that in cases of doubt, speech should win. They accepted a
threshold requirement. They even recognized some second-order arguments in favor of free speech. The most important, and enduring, part
of their analysis, however, is their taking the harmfulness of invasion
of privacy seriously. They linked privacy to personhood, freedom, and
dignity. They identified the dangers that lack of privacy may create.
Because of the difficulty of answering the substantive question
whether the invasion of privacy in a particular case is justified, who is
entrusted with the decisionmaking power becomes extremely important. Warren and Brandeis's article reminds us that the media, which

law against the conception that resolving disputes according to law and indicating what
is and is not legal exhausts law's task. I believe that the law participates-not uniquely,
but importantly because of its visibility and its monopoly over state force-in validating
society's values. Much of the rhetoric of judicial opinions, and the uses made of them in
politics and in civics education, makes sense only if the role of the law goes beyond these
narrow, though central and important, tasks. It is not clear whether and how the law
could achieve the complex goal of affirming the legality of speech while indicating that it
was unjustified. Maybe the dissent in Florida Star, and the approach of judges such as
the one who decided in favor of the press in Neff while criticizing its conduct, have the
desired effect: the press is not held liable, but the court provides cues that the conduct is
deemed undesirable. However, such conduct may have the opposite impact: the condemnation is registered, but the message is clear that the press may proceed to act by its own
lights, knowing that it can do so with impunity.
86. Nonetheless, their formulations, which are careful and full of ambiguous key
terms, could well serve as a general guideline to the proper resolution of the conflict.
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have this power in the absence of norms, are not simply a disinterested
defender of an ideal of free speech. The ultimate question might be
who should decide what should be regarded as offensive, unethical, and
maybe illegal. Zimmerman explicitly acknowledged that her critique
means that the decisionmakers are going to be the press itself.8 7 Warren and Brandeis said that there is a sense of legitimate public interest
distinct from what the public is in fact interested in and that the press
itself is unlikely to be able to identify this interest well. They prefer
the judges, not the victims. Nor do they prefer the violators who generate the threat and benefit from its materialization."8
Not all journalists publish gossip. There are many people in the
mass media who are seriously trying to strike a good and sensitive balance between privacy and speech. 9 The present state of the law, however, does not encourage them or identify them as the model. The present state of the law tells the press that they have the right to publish,
that they do not have to apologize, and that they do not have to take
care-all because we cannot afford to risk their independence. It is
true that we cannot afford to risk the independence of the press. Nevertheless, we should avoid thinking that a serious loss of privacy is not
something to be lamented, condemned, and educated against. What is
interesting about the Lost Honor of KatharinaBlum"0 is not so much
the journalist's behavior, but the way in which his colleagues saw him
as a victim of free speech. Warren and Brandeis reminded us, especially the press, that combined with the press's effect on freedom, protest, and democracy, the press participates, even if it does not mean to,
in a process of leveling and standardization, thus creating mores that
might themselves be inhibitive.
This effect can be achieved in a number of ways, all very familiar

87. Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 353-55.
88. I prefer Warren and Brandeis's idea that it is possible to identify legitimate
public interest on normative grounds and that this idea should not be reduced to the
community's notions of decency. See Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy

Disclosure Tort and the FirstAmendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64 IOWA L. REv. 185 (1979). I grant that the choice between these two is not simple. See Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy, supra note 38, at 977 (analyzing pri-

vacy in terms of civility and noting that it is not clear whether these standards stem
from the community as it is, or from some idealized sense of the community). For my

purposes here, however, this would not make much of a difference, as long as we do not
say that the best judges of what the community thinks should be published are the

media.
89. In Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 528 (1989), the newspaper defended its

identification of a rape victim, but readily conceded that the publication was a mistaken
departure from its own voluntary guidelines.
90. HEINRICH BOLL, LOST HONOR OF KATHARINA BLUM: How VIOLENCE DEVELOPS &
WHERE IT CAN LEAD (Leila Vennewitz trans., 1975).
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to observers of the media. The first is the fate of voluntary public
figures. The position in American law and journalistic ethics is that
any person who willingly runs for office, or joins into a debate or issue
in which the public has a legitimate interest, does not have a right to
keep anything about their lives private.91 Because it is probably possible to unearth some embarrassing facts about anyone, many individuals may decide to avoid becoming public figures. Therefore, a pattern
of investigation and disclosure may seriously limit the life plans of worthy individuals and cost society its more explorative and inventive potential leaders. The leaders are then likely to be individuals who have
never tried anything nonconformist or extraordinary, who never challenged accepted norms, and who never made mistakes. A related but
distinct point is the fact that significant media exposure is humiliating,
92
one-dimensional, and offensive even if it is accurate and sympathetic.
Thus, people may shun publicity even if they have no skeletons in
their closets. A society in which public disclosure of this sort is the
norm is one in which leaders and readers alike are accustomed to reading about persons and lives under the inevitable constraints of mass
media. The motive may be nobler and more complex than gossip
mongering, but the effect is nonetheless perverting and belittling.
Against this background Warren and Brandeis's call can be reformulated to be a call that the press itself will accept that it cannot be
the judge of its own social adequacy. Because the press is always very
articulate in demanding that no one else should be their own investigators and judges, can it sincerely claim to be the only exception to this
beneficial rule?
V.

EPILOGUE

This paper was originally written in October 1990. Soon after it
was delivered, the public debate about the disclosure of rape victims'
names became intense because of the controversy surrounding the decision to publish the name and details about the woman accusing William Kennedy Smith of rape. While I was preparing this paper for publication, I joined millions of people in watching the drama of the
Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings. Privacy and publicity clearly

91. The fact that they do not have a right to privacy does not necessarily mean
that they inevitably lose all privacy. What the press actually publishes is governed by
complex norms, including the press's sense of decency. It is true that the press knows
many embarrassing private facts about many public figures that would not ordinarily be
published. However, when these private facts are published, the victim usually has no
legal recourse. They often have no social recourse or vindication either.
92. See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940).
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were issues. Thomas made moving comments about the fact that the
loss of privacy involved for him was too much for any job, including
that of a Supreme Court Justice. Feminist commentators spoke of the
hearings as a victory for the claims that what happens between an employer and employee in the workplace is not entitled to be private and
that sexual harassment has stopped being a private matter between
powerful employers and submissive or apprehensive employees. Yet
others felt that, although the hearings were clearly powerful material,
they should have been conducted in camera and not covered live and
brought to the homes of all those interested in watching and hearing.
In fact, some viewers probably were not really interested, but merely
could not bring themselves to get away from it. Part of the anger about
the adequacy of the proceedings in the Senate Committee was because
the Committee did not conduct private inquiries to determine the issue
of Hill's credibility. Yet others felt that the Committee could not have
been trusted with the job and that the secrecy would have invited
abuse. They therefore argued for a public hearing despite the losses of
93
privacy involved.

Clearly, the question here is not one of legal liability. No one has
suggested imposing it.9 4 But I think that the hearings can teach us

things about privacy, publicity, and their costs.
First, the pain of the loss of privacy to an individual, even if the
loss is justified, may be immense. Similarly, the consequences to the
individual's career and to the country's leadership may be substantial. 5 Second, even if there is legitimate public interest in denying
public office to a person who behaves unacceptably, there may be different degrees of losses of privacy involved in different routes. 96 Third,
the procedure may send complex signals about the adequacy of investigating into a candidate's behavior through statements of friends, inti-

93. The hearing could have been made public in a different manner. For example,

it could have been public but not broadcast live, as are many court hearings. This kind
of limited publicity would have allowed some public accountability without bringing the
actual pictures, voices, and details into the living rooms of all Americans.
94. There may be a question of legal liability for leaks. Leaks are related to privacy
in direct ways. In this case they may have triggered the process that led to the publicity.
However, legal liability for leaks is different from liability for publication itself.
95. The American people know quite a number of candidates for office who have
lost, at least in large part, because of a disclosure of facts from their private lives. These
include presidential candidate Gary Hart for an extra-marital affair and Supreme Court
candidate Douglas Ginsburg for smoking marijuana.
96. Ginsburg's withdrawal involved less of a loss of privacy than the procedure
Thomas went through. However, this raises a series of issues. Do we want to encourage
withdrawals like Ginsburg's? This may entail less of a loss of privacy, but encourage
more low-visibility withdrawals. Such withdrawals may be undesirable because they may
be based on taking into account facts that are not really relevant to the job in question.
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mates, or employees.9 7 Fourth, the hearings exposed a fascinating debate about the boundaries between private and public life. Sexual
harassment is a criminal offense. Almost by definition committing sexual harassment, especially by the head of the agency designed to protect its victims, is a matter of legitimate public concern.98 One is not
entitled to keep the fact that one behaves in this way private. However, besides clear cases of blatant sexual harassment, there may be
many harassment cases in which the facts may be interpreted in different ways. In at least some of them, a tribunal may decide that no sexual harassment took place and that it was a matter of bad taste, not
harassment. 99 Thus, investigating and trying the charges may involve
substantial losses of privacy in intimate relationships, irrespective of
the conclusion of the process. With the loss of privacy, or the fear of
loss of privacy, may come losses in the spontaneity and freedom of intimate relationships.10 0
But, whatever emerges on the privacy aspects of these hearings, it
should be clear that they were important and central. We should not
encourage a framework of discussion in which these aspects tend to be
lost or belittled. All may have been better off if this affair had been

handled differently.

97. In Thomas's case those who wanted to hurt his nomination by the disclosure
failed. Therefore, one possible interpretation is that facts of this sort are not relevant
and should not be examined. I believe that this is an unlikely reading of the process.
Many believe that the information was unearthed too late in the confirmation process. If
it had been unearthed before the political fight over the nomination was finished, the
course of events might have been different. This case may lead to more intensive investigations at earlier stages of the process.
98. One may argue that if there is a controversy about whether the behavior is
undesirable or illegal, as is the case concerning consensual homosexual relationships between adults, illegality per se does not create a legitimate public interest. Additionally,
one may argue that if a long time has elapsed since the alleged behavior, the interest in
letting individuals put their past behind them is larger than exposing their past mistakes. The case against disclosure may become stronger if the two factors operate together as, some argue, in Ginsburg's case.
99. The actual hearings did not directly raise this issue because the hearings
turned exclusively on credibility. Thomas conceded that the behavior Hill described
would amount to sexual harassment. The hearings did raise the issue indirectly through
the disclosure of details about Thomas's interactions that would have been viewed as
private absent the allegations.
100. In some circumstances this may justify not seeing sexual harassment as an offense. However, in a culture that is committed to seeing such harassment as a serious
social wrong, this conclusion is unacceptable, although it is not clear that the Clarence
Thomas-Anita Hill hearings are very encouraging to individuals who wish to come forward and complain about sexual harassment. A way must be found to discourage harassment and encourage women not to tolerate it without sacrificing too much in both the
quality of work relations and in the freedom and intimacy crucial for developing personal
relationships.
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